It is well-known that the Gale-Shapley algorithm is not truthful for all agents. Previous studies in this category concentrate on manipulations using incomplete preference lists by a single woman and by the set of all women. Little is known about manipulations by a subset of women or other types of manipulations, such as permutation of complete preference lists.
Introduction
Stability has been a central concept in economic design, ever since the seminal work by Gale and Shapley [8] . Over the years, intensive research has been done in the literature of stable matching. A variety of applications of this problem have also been developed, ranging from college admissions and school matchings [1, 2, 8] to centralized kidney exchange programs [3, 35, 36] and hospitals-residents matchings [20, 21, 33] .
In the standard stable matching model, there is a set of men and a set of women. Each agent has a preference list over a subset of the opposite sex. A matching between men and women is stable if no pair of agents prefer to match with each other than their designated partners. Gale and Shapley [8] put forward an algorithm, aka. the Gale-Shapley algorithm, that computes a stable matching in O(n 2 ) time. The algorithm (men-proposing version) proceeds in multiple rounds. At each round, each man proposes to his favorite woman that has not rejected him yet; and each woman keeps her favorite proposal, if any, and rejects all others. The algorithm iterates until no further proposal can be made.
The algorithm enjoys many desirable properties. It is well-known that the matching returned by the algorithm is preferred by every man to any other stable matching, hence called the M-optimal (for menoptimal) matching. It is also known that all stable matchings form a lattice defined by such a preference relation and the M-optimal matching is the greatest element in the lattice [23] . Furthermore, men and women have strictly opposite preferences over two stable matchings: every man prefers stable matching µ 1 to stable matching µ 2 if and only if every woman prefers µ 2 to µ 1 . As a result, the M-optimal matching is the W-pessimal (for women-pessimal) matching [28] . The smallest element in the lattice, the W-optimal (M-pessimal) matching, can be obtained by swapping the roles of men and women.
A concern with the Gale-Shapley algorithm is its non-truthfulness. While it is known that the algorithm is group strategy-proof 1 for all men [7] , it is not truthful for women. In fact, Roth [31] shows that there is no stable matching algorithm that is strategy-proof for all agents.
Related works
The above impossibility theorem by Roth initiates an interesting literature of finding manipulations for women by fixing men preferences in the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Knuth et al. [24] show that any woman may have at least 1 2 − ǫ ln n and at most (1 + ǫ) ln n different partners in all possible stable matchings, where n is the number of men and ǫ is a positive constant. Gale and Sotomayor [9] show that it is possible for all women to strategically truncate their preference lists so that each of them is matched with their partner in the W-optimal matching, and Teo et al. [39] provide a polynomial time algorithm to find the optimal single-agent truncation manipulation.
Jaramillo et al.
[22] study dropping strategies (aka. blacklist strategies) in a many-to-many setting where agents can remove some entries of true preference lists but no shuffling is allowed. They show that dropping strategies are exhaustive in this setting, i.e., any stable matching can be replicated or improved by using some dropping strategies. Gonczarowski [11] also looks into dropping strategies but focuses on manipulations by all women and give a tight upper bound on the number of men that must be deleted to reach the W-optimal matching in the worst case.
Teo et al.
[39] study permutation manipulations, where a woman can report any permutation of her true preference list 2 . They give an efficient algorithm to compute the best manipulation for a single manipulator. Gupta et al. [13] extends the algorithm from Teo et al. [39] to the so-called P -stable (stable w.r.t preferences P ) Nash equilibrium setting. Aziz et al. [5] also study permutation manipulations in a many-to-one setting, but focus on a single manipulator with quota more than one. Pini et al. [29] create a stable matching mechanism and show that for a single agent, it is computationally hard to manipulate the matching result. All the results, except for the last, do not apply to cases where a coalition of women jointly manipulate.
Results and Techniques
In this paper, we study the game where a coalition of women can manipulate the Gale-Shapley algorithm. The manipulators can use either general manipulation or permutation manipulations.
We first analyze the setting of general manipulations, where agents (women) can report a preference list over any subset of men. We show that a strong Nash equilibrium (i.e,. no subset of manipulators can deviate and get strictly better off) always exists for any subset of women. Moreover, in the strong Nash equilibrium, each manipulator removes every man below her W-optimal partner on her list and in the induced matching, all manipulators can be matched to their W-optimal partners (Theorem 3.2). This result generalizes the results by Teo et al. [39] and Gale and Sotomayor [9] , which consider manipulations by a single woman and the set of all women, respectively. Moreover, the equilibrium outcome is unique and Pareto-dominant for all manipulators, i.e., all manipulators reach a consensus on a single manipulation profile. Furthermore, the set of all stable matchings attainable from general manipulations forms a join-semilattice (Theorem 3.4).
For the more challenging setting of permutation manipulations where agents can permute their preference lists, none of the nice properties in the general manipulation setting continues to hold. We give an example to show that a coalition of women could get worse off by manipulating jointly than each performing a single-agent manipulation (see Appendix D.1 for details). As a result, unlike the general manipulation setting, a unique Pareto-dominant outcome for all manipulators may not exist. We design an efficient algorithm to find a manipulation profile such that the induced matching is Pareto-optimal and stable with respect to true preference lists (Theorem 4.1). Moreover, we give a characterization of the set of Pareto-optimal strategy profile: a strategy profile is Pareto-optimal if and only if it is the outcome of our algorithm (Theorem 4.2). We thus solve the open problem raised by Gusfield and Irving [15] on what can be produced by permutation manipulations using an algorithmic charaterization. See also [26] and [38] for importance of the problem.
Our algorithm is enabled by extensively using a structure called rotation. Another important tool in our analysis is called the suitor graph [26] . The suitor graph is constructed using a desired matching and the preference profile of all truthful agents. It can help construct the manipulators' preference profile that would yield the desired matching. To obtain our results, we first construct the suitor graph according to the W-pessimal matching. Then we eliminate rotations and modify the suitor graph accordingly. We can find out whether the current matching corresponds to feasible manipulations by checking certain connectivity properties of the suitor graph. However, some rotations become exposed only after others are eliminated and thus only closed sets of rotations can be validly eliminated. We then introduce the concept of maximal rotations and prove that only closed sets whose maximal rotations contain manipulators can induce feasible manipulations. However, we cannot afford to enumerate all closed sets since the number grows exponentially. To tackle this, we further introduce the concept of principle sets, whose number is polynomial with respect to the number of men and women, and show that any feasible closed sets can be found if we eliminate feasible principle sets iteratively. A Pareto-optimal strategy profile is found when no such principle set can be eliminated.
Furthermore, we show that Pareto-optimality is equivalent to super-strong Nash equilibrium, i.e., no subset of manipulators can deviate and get weakly better off and at least one gets strictly better off (Theorem 4.6). Besides, we also prove another conceptually interesting result that only minor modifications are needed for the manipulators to perform a Pareto-optimal manipulation (Theorem 4.7), another evidence of the vulnerability of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Our results on permutation manipulations can be seen as a novel generalization of the main result of Teo et al. [39] , who present an algorithm to compute strategies for one manipulator by exhaustively searching for possible partners. However, directly extending their results to coalition manipulations suffers from unacceptable time complexity, since we need to enumerate all possible partner combinations. Our techniques differ from theirs substantially and can provide different insights of the problem. Although these results may suggest that the Gale-Shapley algorithm is vulnerable to coalition manipulations, we show that it is NP-complete to find a manipulation such that the induced matching is strictly better off for all manipulators (Theorem 4.8). In other words, if there is a small manipulation cost for the agents, then: (1) any agent is reluctant to participate in a manipulation that is not strictly better for her (2) any manipulation that is strictly better off is unlikely to be found.
Preliminaries
We consider a stable matching model with a set of men M and a set of women W and assume |M | = |W |. The preference list of a man m, denoted by P (m), in a preference profile P , is a strict total order ≻ P m over a subset of W . Let w 1 ≻ P m w 2 denote that m prefers w 1 to w 2 in profile P . Similarly, the preference list P (w) of a woman w is a strict total order over a subset of M . For simplicity, we use ≻ w to denote the true preference profile when it is clear from the context. A matching is a function µ :
We write µ(m) = w if a man m is matched to a woman w, or µ(m) = m if he is unmatched. Similarly, µ(w) = m if w is matched to m and µ(w) = w if unmatched. For two matchings µ 1 and µ 2 , if for all
A matching is individually rational if no one is matched to someone who is not in his or her preference list. If in a matching µ, a man m and a woman w are not matched together, yet prefer each other to their partners in µ, then (m, w) is called a blocking pair. A matching is stable if it is individually rational and contains no blocking pair.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm is not truthful for women [7] . Given a set of women manipulators, the algorithm can be thought of as a game (henceforth, the manipulation game), between them. Let L ⊆ W be the set of manipulators and N = W \ L be the set of non-manipulators.
Definition 2.1 (Manipulation game)
. Given a true preference profile P , a manipulation game is a tuple (L, A L ), where:
1. L ⊆ W is the set of manipulators; 2. A L = i∈L A i is the set of all possible reported preference profiles.
The outcome of the manipulation game (also called induced matching in this paper) is the matching resulted from the Gale-Shapley algorithm with respect to the reported preference profiles. A manipulator's preference in this game is naturally her true preference in P . We now define three types of manipulations [11, 30, 26] , which determines the elements in A L .
Remark 1. In a manipulation game, only manipulators

Definition 2.2 (General manipulation).
Let O b be the set of strict total orders over any subset of M . In general manipulations, 
Clearly, the truncation manipulation is a special case of the general manipulation. In permutation manipulations, each woman takes interest in all men and a manipulation is simply a total order on M .
Let P (M ) = m∈M P (m) be the preference profile of all men. Similarly, denote the preference profiles for all women, all manipulators and all non-manipulators by P (W ), P (L) and P (N ), respectively. Thus the overall preference profile is P = (P (M ), P (N ), P (L)). Denote by S(P (M ), P (W )) the set of all stable matchings under profile (P (M ), P (W )).
Some of our results are based on the following feasibility assumption of a manipulation [37, 34, 9] . For these results, we also discuss what would happen if we relax this assumption.
Assumption 1 (Feasibility assumption). A manipulation is feasible if the induced matching is stable with respect to the true preference profile.
We call a matching feasible if it is induced by a feasible manipulation. Note that unstable matchings can never be induced from Nash equilibria [9] . Therefore, if a manipulation forms a Nash equilibrium, it must be feasible and Assumption 1 does not bring additional constraints. However, Assumption 1 restricts possible deviations of agents to those that induce stable matchings w.r.t the true preferences, and thus reduces the searching space.
Although Assumption 1 is derived from technical concerns, it is also well-motivated from the stable matching literature. As Roth [34] and Roth and Vande Vate [37] suggest, stability is of great importance for a successful clearinghouse. Empirical evidence shows that most stable mechanisms have succeeded in practice while almost all unstable ones have failed. If the induced matchings were unstable, a manipulation is no longer a Nash equilibrium, thus agents are unlikely to follow and the manipulations fall apart [9] . Such unpredictability makes the unstable matchings less desirable to the manipulators. This is equivalent to what the assumption states: unstable matchings yield low payoffs for the agents.
The following solution concepts are all based on the feasibility assumption.
Definition 2.5 (Nash equilibrium).
A preference profile P (L) = l∈L P (l) of a manipulation game is a Nash equilibrium if ∀l ∈ L, P (l) is a best response to P (L) \ {P (l)}.
In other words, in a Nash equilibrium, l cannot be matched with a better partner in any stable matching she can manipulate to. The above definition can be thought of as the standard Pareto-optimality restricted to feasible matchings. Let S A (P (M ), P (W )) denote the set of all feasible matchings. We sometimes write S A for short when (P (M ), P (W )) is clear from the context. Finally, we say a strategy profile is Pareto-optimal when its induced matching is Pareto-optimal.
General manipulations
Gale and Sotomayor [9] prove that a strong Nash equilibrium always exists if all women are manipulators and use truncation manipulations. They construct explicitly such a strong equilibrium by letting each woman use a truncation manipulation that removes all men ranked below her W-optimal partner. Ma [27] also studies truncation manipulations in the same setting and shows that there is only one Nash equilibrium. In addition, the equilibrium profile admits a unique stable matching, namely, the W-optimal matching. Teo et al.
[39] provide a polynomial time algorithm to find the optimal single-agent manipulation. We extend these results to coalition manipulations and consider any subset L ⊆ W as manipulators. For the remaining part of this section, we provide our findings and results, while the full proofs are deferred to Appendix A. According to Lemma 3.1, it is therefore without loss of generality to focus on truncation manipulations. In the remainder of this section, unless explicitly specified, we say a partner or a matching is W-optimal or W-pessimal for a woman if it is so under the true preference profile.
Super-strong Nash equilibria
It is well-known that any unmatched woman in a stable matching remains unmatched in all stable matchings. Recall that a Nash equilibrium induces a stable matching under true preferences [9] . Any unmatched woman in the W-optimal matching has no incentive to misreport since she will always be unmatched. Thus, we only need to consider the case where no manipulator is unmatched in the W-optimal matching. This result generalizes the result by Gale and Sotomayor [9] , which only considers manipulations by the set of all women. If the set of manipulators contains only one woman, the problem becomes a single-agent manipulation and Theorem 3.2 can also be applied. Thus, in coalition manipulations, every manipulator is matched with the same man as in her best single-agent manipulation.
Lattice structure
Definition 3.1. Given two matchings µ and µ ′ , define µ ∨ = µ ∨ µ ′ to be the matching that matches each man to his more preferred partner and each woman to her less preferred partner in µ and µ ′ . Similarly, we can define µ ∧ = µ ∧ µ ′ , which matches each man to his less preferred partner and each woman to her more preferred partner.
The following theorem states that µ ∨ and µ ∧ are not only well-defined matchings, but also essential to the lattice structure of the set of all stable matchings. Therefore, the set of all stable matchings is a lattice with M and W . Let µ L be a partial matching obtained by restricting the corresponding full matching µ to the set of manipulators and moreover, we call µ an extension of µ L . Let S L A be the set of partial matchings obtained by restricting all matchings in S A to the set of manipulators L. Theorem 3.4. Given the true preference profiles (P (M ), P (W )) and the set of manipulators L, then the set of matchings that can be induced by feasible general manipulations, S A (P (M ), P (W )), is a joinsemilattice 3 , and the set of partial matchings S L A (P (M ), P (W )) is a lattice. Since a finite join-semilattice has a greatest element, if there exist two distinct matchings resulted from super-strong Nash equilibria, at least one matching can be improved. Thus, the matching induced from the super-strong Nash equilibria is unique and Pareto-dominant.
Relaxing the feasibility assumption
Recall that we consider feasible manipulations and if this restriction is relaxed, the strategy profile constructed in Theorem 3.2 is still a strong Nash equilibrium. However, without the feasibility assumption, it is no longer a super-strong Nash equilibrium. A counterexample is provided in Appendix D.2.
Permutation manipulations
In this section, we analyze the open problem raised by Gusfield and Irving [15] on what can be achieved by permutation manipulations. We are interested in algorithmic characterizations of solution concepts such as Pareto-optimal strategy profiles and super-strong Nash equilibria. Formally, we have the following results. 
Moreover, our algorithm provides an algorithmic characterization of Pareto-optimal strategy profiles.
Theorem 4.2. A strategy profile is Pareto-optimal if and only if it is the outcome of Algorithm 1.
Previous results about general manipulations do not carry over here mainly due to the challenge that joint manipulations may result in worse matchings. An example that illustrates this intuition is in Appendix D.1.
To develop the algorithm, we extensively use two structures, rotations [18] and suitor graphs [25] , from the literature. We further develop several new structures such as maximal rotations and principle sets to derive connections between suitor graphs and feasible manipulations. For the remaining part of this section, we provide key ingredients for the design of our algorithm, while the full proofs are deferred to Appendix B.
Rotations
The concept of rotations is first introduced by Irving [18] when solving the stable roommate problem, which is a natural generalization of the stable marriage problem.
In the Gale-Shapley algorithm, if a woman w i rejects a man m j , then w i must have a better partner than m j in the W-pessimal matching. Thus in any stable matching, w i cannot be matched with any man ranked below m j in w i 's list. As a result, we can safely remove all impossible partners from each man or woman's preference list after each iteration of the algorithm. We call each man or woman's preference list after the removal a reduced list, and the set of all reduced lists a reduced table. Note that rotations are known as improvement cycles in some literature and is useful in converting the M-optimal matching to the W-optimal matching [4, 11, 17] .
We also use R = (M, W, W ′ ) to represent a rotation, where M is the sequence of men and W and W ′ are the sequences of the first and the second women in M's reduced lists. Since W i+1 = W ′ i by definition of rotations, we write W r = W ′ , where W r is the sequence W with each woman shifted left by one position. We may sometimes use m i and w i to mean the i-th agent in M and W when the order is important.
After the termination of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, one can still change the matching by eliminating rotations. The elimination of a rotation R is to force each woman w i in W to reject her current proposer m i and let m i propose to w i+1 . It is clear that after the elimination, each woman still holds a proposal, i.e. there is still a matching between men and women. More importantly, it can be shown that the matching is stable w.r.t the true preference. We say a rotation R = (M, W, W r ) moves m i from w i to w i+1 and moves w i from m i to m i−1 since after eliminating the rotation, the corresponding matching matches m i and w i+1 .
It is shown that each stable matching corresponds to a set of rotations, and there exists an order of elimination that produces the matching. We do not discuss in detail here, but refer readers to [15] .
Suitor graph
Suitor graph is another important structure for our analysis. It is proposed by Kobayashi and Matsui [26] when considering the problem that given a preference profile for all truthful agents P (M ) and P (N ), is there a profile P (L) for the manipulators such that the M-optimal matching of the combined preference profile is a certain matching µ? The detailed definition of suitor graph is as follows:
Definition 4.2 (Suitor graph; Kobayashi and Matsui [26])
. Given a matching µ, a preference profile for all men P (M ) and a preference profile for all non-manipulators P (N ), the corresponding suitor graph
, which can be constructed using the following steps: 
Theorem 4.3 (Kobayashi and Matsui [26]). Given a matching µ, a preference profile with P (M ) for all men and P (N ) for all non-manipulators, there exists a profile for the manipulators P (L) such that µ is the M-optimal stable matching for the total preference profile (P (M ), P (N ), P (L)), if and only if for every vertex v in the corresponding suitor graph G(P (M ), P (N ), µ), there exists a path from s to v (s is a virtual vertex in the graph). Moreover, if such a P (L) exists, it can be constructed in O(n 2
).
Pareto-optimal strategy profiles
We are now ready to combine the structures mentioned above to analyze permutation manipulations. Notice that eliminating more rotations results in weakly better matchings for all women. Thus, the manipulators' objective is to eliminate as many rotations as possible by permuting their preference lists. Since there is no direct rotation elimination in the Gale-Shapley algorithm, we try to figure out what kind of rotations can be eliminated, i.e., after eliminating these rotations, the corresponding matching is in S A .
We first analyze the structure of the set of rotations. Rotations are not always exposed in a reduced table. Some rotations become exposed only after other rotations are eliminated. Thus, we define the precedence relation between rotations and based on that, we introduce two concepts, closed set and maximal rotations.
Definition 4.3 (Precedence
2 ) if R 1 and R 2 share a common man m such that R 1 moves m from some woman to w and R 2 moves m from w to some other woman. Let the relation precede be the transitive closure of the explicit precedence relation, denoted by ≺. Also,
Definition 4.4 (Closed set). A set of rotations R is closed if for each R ∈ R, any rotation R ′ with R ′ ≺ R is also in R. A closed set C is minimal in a family of closed sets C , if there is no other closed set in C that is a subset of C. Moreover, define CloSet(R) to be the minimal closed set that contains R.
Definition 4.5 (Maximal rotation). Given a closed set of rotations R, R is called a maximal rotation of
R if no rotation R ′ ∈ R satisfies R ≺ R ′ . Let M
ax(R) denote the set of all the maximal rotations in R.
Furthermore, R is called a principle set if M ax(R) contains only one rotation.
Henceforth, R 1 precedes R 2 if R 2 can only be exposed after R 1 is eliminated. A rotation R can only be exposed after all rotations preceding R are eliminated. Thus only closed sets can be validly eliminated. Also, a closed set of rotations R is uniquely determined by M ax(R). Therefore, given a closed set R, the corresponding matching after eliminating rotations in R is determined by M ax(R).
The following theorem shows that closed sets of rotations are all that we need to consider.
Theorem 4.4 (Irving and Leather [19]). Let S be the set of all stable matchings for a given preference profile, there is a one-to-one correspondence between S and the family of all closed sets.
Therefore, we need to understand the changes made to the suitor graph when a rotation R is eliminated. We keep track of every proposal made by men in R and modify the graph accordingly. We first assume that the virtual vertex s is comparable with each man and for every w ∈ W and every m ∈ M , m ≻ w s. When eliminating a rotation, we follow the steps below to modify the graph:
1. Let all women in R reject their current partner, i.e., delete the edge (w i , m i ) involved in R for each i; 2. Arbitrarily choose a man m i in R and let him propose to the next woman w in his preference list: Let G and G ′ be the suitor graphs corresponding to the reduced tables before and after the elimination of R. It is easy to check that after modifying G using the steps defined above, the resulting suitor graph is exactly G ′ . From Theorem 4.3, the most important property of the suitor graph is the existence of a path from s to any other vertex. Therefore, we focus on the change of strongly connected components and their connectivity in the suitor graph before and after the elimination of rotations. The following lemma gives some connectivity properties of the suitor graph after eliminating a rotation. With Lemma 4.1, we do not need to worry about vertices that are reachable from vertices in R, for they will remain reachable after the elimination. Also, vertices that are overtaken and the other vertices reachable from overtaken vertices can be reached from vertices in R after the elimination.
In fact, every vertex is reachable from s in the initial suitor graph. Therefore, if a vertex becomes unreachable from s after eliminating a rotation, there must exist some edge that is deleted during the elimination, which only happens when some woman is overtaken. The next lemma extends Lemma 4.1 to a closed set of rotations.
Lemma 4.2. After eliminating a closed set of rotations R, each v in R is reachable from at least one vertex in M ax(R), i.e., there exists a path to v from a vertex in M ax(R).
This lemma is a generalization of Lemma 4.1. If R 2 explicitly precedes R 1 , then they must contain a common man. Therefore, after eliminating R 1 , vertices in R 1 can reach any vertex that is previously reachable from R 2 . The analysis goes on recursively until some rotation has no predecessors.
Given a closed set of rotations R, we say R can be eliminated for simplicity, if the corresponding matching after eliminating rotations in R is in S A .
Lemma 4.3. A closed set of rotations R can be eliminated if and only if after eliminating R, every vertex of rotations in M ax(R) can be reached from s.
The following theorem provides us a desired property of closed sets of rotations that can be eliminated.
Theorem 4.5. Given a closed set of rotations R, if R can be eliminated, then there exists a rotation R ∈ R such that CloSet(R) can be eliminated.
We are ready to design Algorithm 1 to compute a Pareto-optimal strategy profile. For any iteration of Algorithm 1, the matching at the beginning of each iteration is in S A . Therefore, according to Theorem 4.5, if a closed set of rotations R can be eliminated, we can always find a principle set P * contained in R such that P * can be eliminated. Since the number of principle sets equals to the number of rotations, which is polynomial and can be efficiently computed [14] , given a matching in S A , we figure out an efficient way to find a weakly better matching in S A . Using this method as a sub-routine, we are able to design an algorithm to find a Pareto-optimal strategy profile for permutation manipulations. The correctness and time complexity proofs of Algorithm 1 are deferred to Appendix B.5.
Notice that at each iteration, the algorithm has multiple principle sets to select from. To prove our characterization result in Theorem 4.2, we show that for each possible Pareto-optimal matching µ, there exists a way to select the principle sets to eliminate in each iteration such that the induced matching from the output of Algorithm 1 is µ (see Appendix B.6 for details).
Algorithm 1: Find a Pareto-optimal strategy profile for permutation manipulations
Find the set of all rotations R and all principle sets P = {CloSet(R) | R ∈ R}; while True do Construct C = {P ∈ P | P can be eliminated}; if C = ∅ then Construct P (L) for L and return; else Arbitrarily choose a principle set P * ∈ C and eliminate P * ;
Incentive property and Inconspicuousness
The Pareto-optimal strategy profiles also enjoy incentive properties. However, if we relax the feasibility assumption, the strategy profiles computed by Algorithm 1 do not necessarily form super-strong Nash equilibria. A counter-example is provided in Appendix D.3.
Moreover, in order to obtain a feasible matching, the manipulators only need slight modifications to their true preference lists by moving at most one man in her true preference list to some higher ranking. For each woman w, let m 1 and m 2 be the top two received proposals according to her modified preference lists P ′ (w) 5 , then w can modify her true preference list by promoting m 2 to the place right after m 1 only to generate the same induced matching. 
Hardness results
The above discussion shows that the Gale-Shapley algorithm is vulnerable to coalition manipulation. However, it is NP-complete to find a manipulation in which every manipulator is strictly better off. These results hold even without the feasibility assumption.
Theorem 4.8. In permutation manipulations, it is NP-complete to find a manipulation such that the induced matching (not necessarily stable w.r.t the true preference profile) is strictly better off for all manipulators.
According to Theorem 4.8, one immediate corollary is that the number of different Pareto-optimal matchings cannot be polynomial in the number of men and women. For otherwise, we can enumerate all such matchings by Algorithm 1 to develop a polynomial time algorithm. Actually, there are 2 Θ(|M |+|W |) different induced matchings, which is Pareto-optimal and weakly better off for all manipulators, in the constructed stable matching problem used in the reduction of Theorem 4.8 (see Appendix C for details). Last but not least, to compute the number of matchings that are Pareto-optimal and strictly better off for all manipulators is #P-Hard. Proof. Let µ be any matching in S A and P (L) be the corresponding reported preference profile by the manipulators in a Nash equilibrium of general manipulation. Therefore, µ is the M-optimal matching of P ′ = (P (M ), P (N ), P (L)). We construct a truncated preference profile P t (L) for the manipulators where for each manipulator w, µ(w) is the last in her preference lists. (If w is single in µ, her preference list remains the same as her true preference list). Notice that µ is stable under the true preference profile. We show that µ is also stable under m) . From the construction of P t , we know that m ≻ P w µ(w) is also true ∀w ∈ W . Also, w ≻ P m µ(m) is true since no man's preference list is changed. Thus, (m, w) is a blocking pair under P , which contradicts to the stability of µ.
We claim that µ is the W-pessimal matching under P t . Otherwise, assume µ * is the W-pessimal matching and µ = µ * . For each manipulator w, we have µ(w) = µ * (w), for µ(w) is already the last man in her preference list. We consider µ * under P ′ . Since all manipulators are matched to the same men in the two matchings and µ = µ * , there must be a non-manipulator w ′ such that µ(w ′ ) ≻ P ′ w ′ µ * (w ′ ). Thus, µ * is not stable under P ′ since µ is the W-pessimal matching under P ′ and there is a blocking pair (m ′′ , w ′′ ). Moreover, w ′′ cannot be a manipulator, otherwise since µ(m ′′ ) = µ * (m ′′ ) (implied by µ(w ′′ ) = µ * (w ′′ )) and m ′′ ≻ P ′ w ′′ µ(m ′′ ), m ′′ is in P t (w ′′ ) so that (m ′′ , w ′′ ) blocks µ * under P t . As a result, w ′′ is a nonmanipulator but (m ′′ , w ′′ ) also blocks µ * under P t , since the preference lists of both m and w are the same in the two preference profiles. A contradiction.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
In order to prove Theorem 3.2, we first consider the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. Let (P (M ), P (W )) be the true preference profile and P (L) be the reported profile by the manipulators. If for each manipulator w, her W-optimal partner is not removed from her list in truncation manipulation, then S(P (M ), P (N ), P (L)) ⊆ S(P (M ), P (W )).
Proof. Suppose not and there exists a matching µ which is in S(P (M ), P (N ), P (L)) but not in S(P (M ), P (W )). Then, there exists a blocking pair (m, w) in µ under true preference lists. For m, since his preference list is not modified, he prefers w to µ(m) in true preference lists and the lists after truncation.
If w is not single in µ, then m is still in her preference list after truncation manipulation since m ≻ w µ(w), which forms a blocking pair in µ. Otherwise, if w is single in µ, notice that, since the order of each man and each woman's preference list is not changed, W-optimal matching is in S(P (M ), P (N ), P (L)). Thus, w is single in W-optimal matching and according to the assumption, she is not a manipulator.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We first prove that each manipulator is matched to her M-optimal partner if they report P (L). According to Lemma A.1 the induced matching µ must be in S(P (M ), P (W )). Notice that, W-optimal matching is still in S(P (M ), P (N ), P (L)). Thus, according to Theorem 3.1, each manipulator is not single after manipulation, and she cannot be matched with a man worse than her W-optimal partners since she already removes him. Also, each woman cannot get a partner better than her W-optimal partner. Thus, all manipulators must be matched with their W-optimal partner.
Next we show that it is a super-strong Nash equilibrium for all manipulators to do so. Suppose that there exists a sub-coalition of women L ′ ⊆ L who can deviate from P (L) so that each manipulator is weakly better off and at least one is strictly better off. However, the induced matching must be stable under true preference lists, but all manipulators are matched with their W-optimal partner already. A contradiction.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Before we discuss the lattice structure of the set of S A , we first prove a lemma about the relation between the length of the preference lists and the induced matching. We say a preference profile P 1 = (P (M ), P (N ), P 1 (L)) is shorter than another P 2 = (P (M ), P (N ), P 2 (L)) if for each w ∈ L, |P 1 (w)| ≤ |P 2 (w)|. In other words, P 1 is shorter than P 2 if all manipulators remove no less men in P 1 than in P 2 .
Lemma A.2. Let P 1 and P 2 be two preference profiles, and µ 1 and µ 2 be the two corresponding M-optimal matchings, if for each manipulator, her W-optimal partner is in both P 1 and P 2 , and P 1 is shorter than P 2 , then µ 1 W µ 2 .
Proof. The lemma is a corollary of Lemma A.1. Since P 1 is shorter than P 2 , P 1 can be viewed as a manipulation starting from P 2 . By Lemma A.1, the set of stable matchings under P 1 is a subset of that under P 2 . Moreover, the Gale-Shapley outputs the W-pessimal matching and thus, µ 1 W µ 2 .
Lemma A.3. Given two preference profiles P 1 and P 2 , and two corresponding M-optimal matchings by µ 1 and µ 2 . Let
Proof. It is easy to check that P ∩ (L) is a legal profile for the manipulators, i.e., the preference list for each manipulator w can be obtained by truncating her true preference list. According to Lemma A.2, we have µ ∩ W µ 1 and µ ∩ W µ 2 , so that from the definition of µ ∧ , we have µ ∩ W µ ∧ . To show that µ ∧ is identical to µ ∩ , we only need to show that µ ∧ W µ ∩ . We claim that µ ∧ is a stable matching under P ∩ , and thus µ ∧ W µ ∩ because µ ∩ is the W-pessimal matching under P ∩ .
For each w, µ ∧ (w) w µ 1 (w), so µ ∧ (w) is in P 1 (w). Similarly µ ∧ (w) is also in P 2 (w). Therefore µ ∧ (w) is individually rational under P ∩ . Assume that µ ∧ is not stable under P ∩ . Then there must be a blocking pair (m, w) and m ≻ w µ ∧ (w) and w ≻ m µ ∧ (m) under P ∩ . However, the two inequalities also hold in both P 1 (w) and P 2 (w). Notice that (m, w) is unmatched in at least one of the two matchings µ 1 and µ 2 , otherwise µ ∧ (w) = m. Thus, (m, w) blocks either µ 1 or µ 2 , which produces a contradiction.
However, it is not a meet-semilattice. Consider the counter-example shown in Table 1 . The matching results are in Table 2 . Table 2 : Induced matchings and their meet Nevertheless, we prove that the set of partial matchings S L A is a lattice.
Lemma A.4. Given P 1 = (P (M ), P (N ), P 1 (L)) and P 2 = (P (M ), P (N ), P 2 (L)), suppose µ 1 and µ 2 are the two corresponding M-optimal matchings. Let
Proof. We construct a preference profile P ∪ as follows. For each w ∈ L, she removes all men ranked below µ ∨ (w) in her true preference list. We prove that the corresponding M-optimal matching µ ∪ is an extension of µ L ∨ , i.e., µ L ∪ = µ L . Using similar techniques in the proof of Lemma A.3, we conclude that µ ∨ is a stable matching with respect to preference profile P ∪ . For each w ∈ L, since µ ∨ (w) is the last one in her preference list and they must be matched to their W-pessimal partner under P ∪ , µ ∨ (w) must be equal to
Lemma A.3 is clearly true when restricted to manipulators. Combining the above two lemmas together, we immediately get Theorem 3.4.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.5
This theorem is a direct corollary of the following theorem. Theorem A.1 (Limits on successful manipulation, Demange et al. [6] ). Let P be the true preferences (not necessarily strict) of the agents, and let P ′ differ from P in that some coalition C of men and women misstate their preferences. Then there is no matching µ, stable for P ′ , which is strictly preferred to every stable matching under the true preferences P by all members of C.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. In proof of Theorem 3.2, we have already shown that for all stable matchings in S(P (M ), P (N ), P (L)), each manipulators are matched with their W-optimal partner. Applying Theorem A.1 with C ⊆ L, we can conclude that there is no matching in S(P (M ), P (N ), P (L \ C), P (C)) is strictly preferred to every stable matching in S(P (M ), P (N ), P (L)) for all members of C. Therefore, the constructed strategy profile is a strong Nash equilibrium.
B Omitted proofs in Section 4 B.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
The proof is based on the following lemma.
Lemma B.1. For each man m i in R, in the procedure of eliminating the rotation R, w i+1 (the subscript is taken modulo r) is the first woman to accept him, and each woman in R accepts only one proposal during the procedure.
Proof. According to the definition of rotations, w i+1 is the second in m i 's reduced list. If there are other women between w i and w i+1 in m i 's preference list, they are absent from the reduced list because these women already hold proposals from better men. Henceforth, even though m i proposes to these women, they reject him. But m i is in w i+1 's reduced list since w i+1 is in m i 's. Therefore, m i is a better choice for w i+1 and w i+1 accepts him.
After the elimination, each man m i in R proposes to w i+1 and each man is accepted only once. Also each woman w i+1 holds a new proposal from m i and thus accepts at least once. The conclusion is immediate since the total number of each man being accepted equals to the total number of each woman accepting a new partner.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. For each m i in R, R moves m i from w i to w i+1 . As a result, there exists an edge from w i+1 to m i . We now prove that each m i has an outgoing edge pointing to w i , and all agents in R then form a cycle, and thus in the same strongly connected component. Before the elimination, w i is the partner of m i , so there is an edge from m i to w i . If w i is a manipulator, the edge (m i , w i ) is not removed during the elimination according to the steps described above. If w i is not a manipulator, then only two incoming edges are remained after the elimination and these edges are from the best two men among those who propose to her. According to Lemma B.1, only one man, namely m i−1 , is accepted. Thus, m i−1 is the best suitor of w i . We claim that m i is the second best and the edge from m i is still in the suitor graph. Otherwise, suppose m ′ is a better choice than m i to w i . Then m ′ is also in R. We let m ′ propose first, and w i accepts m ′ , which makes w i accepts at least twice. A contradiction.
Since each woman can be reached from her partner before the elimination, it is without loss of generality to assume that a vertex v can be reached from a man m in R through a path p. Let u be the last vertex in p such that u is in R or is overtaken by a vertex in R. If u is in R, then after the elimination, m can reach u since they are in the same strongly connected component. If u is overtaken by some vertex m ′ , then during the elimination, an edge (m ′ , u) is added to the graph. Thus, m can reach u through m ′ . Henceforth, in any case, u is reachable. Since in p the vertices between u and v are neither in R nor overtaken by some vertex in R, the path from u to v remains in the modified graph. Therefore v is reachable from m and also from any vertex in R for they are in the same strongly connected component after the elimination.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof. We eliminate the rotations in R one by one and generate a sequence of rotations q = (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n ). R i is the i-th rotation to eliminate, and after eliminating R n , all rotations in R are eliminated. Denote q i as the set of the rotations before R i in q. For each i, q i is a closed set. We call i the sequence number of q i and we prove by induction on the sequence number that after eliminating q i , all vertices in q i can be reached from a vertex in M ax(q i ). For i = 1, q i = {R 1 }, the case is trivial from Lemma 4.1. Assume the statement is true for i = k, then for i = k + 1, we only eliminate one more rotation R k+1 than in the case with i = k. R k+1 is in M ax(q k+1 ) otherwise there exists another rotation R ′ in q k such that R k+1 ≺ R ′ and then q k is not a closed set. Let D = M ax(q k ) \ M ax(q k+1 ). Rotations in D are no longer maximal rotations simply because R k+1 is eliminated, which indicates that rotations in D explicitly precede R k+1 . Henceforth, every rotation R in D has a common agent with R k+1 and each vertex u reachable from R is reachable from that common agent. According to Lemma 4.1, u can be reached from R k+1 . For each vertex u ′ that is not reachable from rotations in D, it must be reachable from another rotation R ′ in M ax(q k ) through path p and R ′ is still in M ax(q k+1 ). If p is still in the suitor graph, then we are done. Otherwise, some vertices in p must be in R k+1 or is overtaken by a man in R k+1 . Let z be the last vertex in p such that z is in R k+1 or is overtaken. z can be reached from R k+1 and the path from z to u ′ is not affected by the elimination. Therefore, u ′ is reachable from R k+1 .
B.3 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Proof. If a closed set of rotations R can be eliminated, then every vertex is reachable after R is eliminated. As a result, any member of M ax(R) is reachable.
If after eliminating R, any member of M ax(R) can be reached from s, then we need to show that all other vertices are also reachable from s. We split all vertices into two parts. Let V denote the set of all the vertices that can be reached from members of M ax(R). If a vertex v is in V , then v is reachable from s through M ax(R). If v is not in V , then in the initial graph, there is a path p from s to v. We claim that all the vertices in path p is not in any of the rotations in R or overtaken when eliminating a rotation. Otherwise, according to Lemma 4.2, v is reachable from M ax(R). Thus, the path p is still in the graph after eliminating all the rotations in R.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 4.5
We first consider the following lemma about the maximal rotations of a closed set that can be eliminated.
Lemma B.2. If a closed set R can be eliminated, then every rotation in M ax(R) must contain a manipulator.
Proof. Assume on the contrary that there exists a rotation R in M ax(R) such that R contains no manipulators. We can always change the order of elimination to make R the last to eliminate. We prove that after eliminating R, any vertex in R is not reachable from s. From the proof of Lemma 4.1, we know that all vertices in R form a cycle after eliminating R. Each man in R has only one incoming edge from his current partner who is also in R. Each woman has two incoming edges, one from her partner in R and another from her former partner which is also in R. Thus, every vertex in R has no incoming edges from outside the cycle and thus is not reachable from s.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Let V be the set of all vertices in R. After eliminating R, we arbitrarily choose a vertex v in V . In the corresponding suitor graph, there is a path p = (v 0 = s, v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n = v) from s to v since R can be eliminated. Let u be the first vertex in p such that u is in V . u is obviously not v 1 , or otherwise the edge (s, u) will be deleted. Moreover, u must be in L, since any non-manipulator can only be reached from a node in V if she is overtaken during the elimination. Assume u = v l and l > 1. Then the sub-path p ′ = (v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v l = u) is not affected (no vertices in V or overtaken) during the elimination. Henceforth, p ′ is in the original suitor graph before eliminating R. Now we consider the set R ′ = {R ∈ R|u ∈ R}. For any R in R ′ , if we eliminate CloSet(R), the sub-path is also not affected. Therefore CloSet(R) can be eliminated according to Lemma 4.3.
B.5 Remaining proof of Theorem 4.1
To prove the correctness of the algorithm. We begin with the following lemma. Lemma B.3. Given a set of manipulators L ∈ W , and the true preference profile P = (P (M ), P (W )). Let µ be any matching in S A and R be the corresponding closed set of rotations. Then there exists a preference profile P µ (L) for L such that µ is the M-optimal stable matching of the preference profile P µ = (P (M ), P (N ), P µ (L)), and the reduced table of P after eliminating R is exactly the reduced table of P µ before eliminating any rotation.
Proof. Since µ is in S A , there exists P ′ = (P (M ), P (N ), P ′ (L)) such that the induced matching µ. For each w ∈ L, we modify P ′ (w) as follows:
1. delete all men m such that m ≻ P w µ(w);
2. reinsert them at the beginning according to their order in w's true preference list;
3. move µ(w) to the position right after all men m such that m ≻ P w µ(w);
Denote the modified preference profile by P ′ µ . In fact, P ′ µ is the P µ we are looking for. We first prove that µ is the M-optimal matching under P ′ µ . After the first two steps of modifications, the M-optimal matching is still µ, since for each w, we only change the position of men ranked higher than µ(w) in her true preference list, who must have not proposed to w under P ′ , and thus do not change the output of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Otherwise, if a man m with m ≻ P w µ(w) has proposed to w, then we must have w ≻ P ′ m µ(m), which is equivalent to w ≻ P m µ(m). Thus (m, w) forms a blocking pair in µ under the true preference profile P , contradicting to the stability of µ under P . In the third step, we move µ(w) to the position right after all men ranked higher than µ(w) in the true preference list P (w). Consider all the men m ′ with m ′ ≻ P ′ w µ(w) but µ(w) ≻ P ′ µ w m ′ . m ′ must have not proposed to w under P ′ , or otherwise µ(w) cannot be the partner of w. Therefore, the positions of the men in P ′ µ do not affect the output of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Let T Pµ be the reduced table of P after eliminating R and T P ′ µ be the reduced tables of P ′ µ . We already know that for each woman, her partners in the two reduced tables are the same, which is µ(w). In fact, a change of reduced table happens if and only if a woman accepts a proposal from a man m and removes everyone ranked below m in her preference list. Henceforth, in the reduced list of each woman, no man is ranked below her current partner. Therefore, to prove that T Pµ is the same as T P ′ µ , if suffices to show that for each woman, P and P ′ µ are the same after removing all men ranked below her current partner, which is clear from the construction of P ′ µ .
From Theorem 4.4, we know that only closed sets need to be considered. Although the Lemma B.2 has already ruled out all closed sets that have a maximal rotation containing only non-manipulators, there are still exponentially many possibilities. However, Theorem 4.5 shows that every closed set that can be eliminated contains a principle set, which can also be eliminated. A natural idea is to iteratively grow the closed set by adding principle sets. The above lemma shows that after each iteration, we can construct a problem that has the current matching as its initial matching, and contains rotations that are not yet eliminated. If we find a principle set that can be eliminated in the constructed problem, it can also be eliminated in the original problem.
Correctness of Algorithm 1. Algorithm 1 can be summarized as iteratively eliminating principle sets. Inside each iteration, we scan all rotations to find closed sets that can be eliminated. The algorithm terminates since there are finite rotations. Let P = (P (M ), P (W )) be the original preference profile and S be the set of all stable matchings in terms of P . Let R be the set of all rotations.
Assume on the contrary that the algorithm terminates with a strategy profile P µ that is not Paretooptimal. Denote µ as the matching produced by P µ and let R µ be the corresponding set of rotations. Then there must be another strategy profile P * that dominates P µ . Suppose µ * is the induced matching of P * and R * is the corresponding closed set of rotations.
According to Lemma B.3, we can construct a problem with the original preference profile P ′ such that µ is the M-optimal matching of P ′ and the reduced table of P after eliminating R µ is exactly the reduced table of P ′ before eliminating any rotation. It follows that the set of all rotations of P ′ is exactly R ′ = R \ R µ and the set of all stable matchings of P ′ is S ′ = {µ ′ ∈ S(P (M ), P (W ))|µ ′ W µ}. Henceforth, µ * is also in S A (P ′ ). Since P * dominates P µ , we have R µ ⊂ R * and R * \ R µ ⊆ R ′ . Therefore, according to Theorem 4.5, there exists a closed set CloSet(R) that can be eliminated in P ′ . Let µ ′ be the induced matching after eliminating CloSet(R) in P ′ and P µ ′ (L) be a preference profile for the manipulators such that the induced matching is µ ′ , i.e., µ ′ is the M-optimal matching of profile P µ ′ = (P (M ), P (N ), P µ ′ (L)). As a result, µ ′ is in S A (P ) with corresponding profile P µ ′ (L). Thus, after eliminating R µ , CloSet(R) can still be eliminated, which contradicts to the termination of the algorithm.
To show the complexity of Algorithm 1, we need the following definition. Complexity of Algorithm 1. Note that H is exactly the directed version Hasse diagram of the precedence relation between rotations. For a rotation R, CloSet(R) is the set of vertices that can be reached from R through a directed path in H r . We split the algorithm into the initialization part and iteration part, and assume |M | = |W | = n.
In the initialization part, we first compute the initial matching using the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which can be computed in O(n 2 ) time. Next we find all rotations with respect to preference profile P and also find all the principle sets. These two operations depend on the graph H r . However, the graph H is the transitive reduction of D, and the construction of H is somewhat complex. Gusfield [14] discusses how to find all rotations, whose number is O(n 2 ), in O(n 2 ) time. Instead of constructing H, Gusfield considered a sub-graph H ′ of D, whose transitive closure is identical to D. Moreover, H ′ can be constructed in O(n 2 ) time. We will not discuss how to construct H ′ in detail but only apply Gusfield's results here. Then for each rotation R, we only need to search H ′ to find CloSet(R), which takes O(n 2 ) time. Thus, we finish the initialization step in O(n 4 ) time since there are O(n 2 ) rotations altogether.
The iteration part is the bottleneck of the algorithm. At least one rotation is eliminated for each iteration, and thus O(n 2 ) iterations are needed. Inside each iteration, we need to construct the set C . There are O(n 2 ) principle sets and to determine whether a principle set can be eliminated, we need to simulate the GaleShapley algorithm and modify the suitor graph accordingly. After the modification, we traverse the suitor graph to see if each vertex is reachable. Both of the two operations takes O(n 2 ) time. Thus, the construction of C takes O(n 4 ) time. In the If-Else statement, if we find a principle set that can be eliminated, we eliminate the principle set and modify the suitor graph in O(n 2 ). Otherwise, we traverse the suitor graph to construct the preference profile for L according to Theorem 4.3. Thus, the If-Else statement takes O(n 2 ) time and totally, the time complexity is O(n 6 ).
B.6 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. Assume the P (L) is a Pareto-optimal strategy profile for the manipulators. Let µ be the matching produced by P (L) and R µ the corresponding set of rotations. µ can be forced to be the induced matching by always choosing the principle set that is a subset of R µ . Let R k be the rotations eliminated so far at the end of the k-th iteration and µ k be the corresponding matching . We prove by induction on the iterations that at the end of each iteration, R k is a subset of R µ . In the first iteration, R µ is in S A , so there exists a principle set P ⊂ R µ that can be eliminated. Assume the statement holds for the k-th iteration. At the beginning of the (k + 1)-th iteration, µ k is the induced matching, and R k is a subset of R µ by the inductive hypothesis, then there exists at least one principle set P k+1 ⊂ R µ \ R k that can be eliminated. Therefore, at the end of the (k + 1)-th iteration, R k+1 = R k ∪ P k+1 is also a subset of R µ . When the algorithm terminates, the set of all eliminated rotations R is also a subset of R µ . Assume R = R µ , then we can find some principle set to eliminate, which contradicts to the termination condition of the algorithm. Therefore the Pareto-optimal strategy profile can be found by the algorithm.
B.7 Proof of Theorem 4.6
Gonczarowski and Friedgut [12] consider the sisterhood between manipulators and non-manipulators, and give the following result.
Theorem B.1 (Gonczarowski and Friedgut [12] ). Given agents' strict preferences over agents of the other sex, and a set of manipulators L ∈ W are allowed to use general manipulations, if no lying woman is worse off, then (1) No woman is worse off; (2) No man is better off.
Since our setting is a special case of theirs, the above theorem applies to our setting.
Proof of Theorem 4.6. We first prove that all super-strong Nash equilibrium outcomes are Pareto-optimal matchings. Assume on the contrary that a matching µ is induced by a super-strong Nash equilibrium but is not Pareto-optimal. Thus there exists a matching µ ′ ∈ S A and µ ′ = µ such that µ ′ (w) w µ(w), ∀w ∈ W and ∃w ′ ∈ W such that µ ′ (w ′ ) ≻ w ′ µ(w ′ ). It follows that µ ′ (l) = µ(l), ∀l ∈ L because µ is induced by a super-strong Nash equilibrium, and thus we cannot have µ ′ (l) ≻ l µ(l). Let R µ and R µ ′ be the corresponding set of rotations to µ and µ ′ , respectively. Since µ ′ (w) w µ(w), ∀w ∈ W , we have R µ ⊂ R µ ′ and R µ ′ \R µ is a closed set that still can be eliminated after eliminating R µ . Let R ∈ M ax(R µ ′ \ R µ ). By Lemma B.2, there exists a manipulator l in R. Thus µ ′ (l) ≻ µ(l), which contradicts to the fact that µ ′ (l) = µ(l), ∀l ∈ L.
Now we prove that any Pareto-optimal matching can be induced by a super-strong Nash equilibrium. Assume, for purposes of contradiction, that a matching µ is Pareto-optimal but cannot be induced by a superstrong Nash equilibrium. Thus any preference profile that yields matching µ is not a super-strong Nash equilibrium. In particular, we let the manipulators use the inconspicuous manipulation defined above. Let P be the true preference profile and P ′ be the inconspicuous preference profile that would yield matching µ ∈ S A (P ). Since P ′ is not a super-strong Nash equilibrium, there exists a subset L s of L, if jointly misreport another preference profile, can make the induced matching to be
, since otherwise we have µ ′ (w) P w µ(w), ∀w ∈ W , which contradicts to the Pareto-optimality of µ. Notice that, in inconspicuous preference profile P ′ , we have for all w ∈ W , m ≻ P ′ w µ(w) if and only if m ≻ P w µ(w) since the order of men ranked higher than µ(w) in P ′ (w) is exactly the same as P (w). Therefore, for all l ∈ L s , µ ′ (l) ≻ P ′ l µ(l). However, according to Theorem B.1, since no manipulators are worse off according to P ′ , we have that no women are worse off according to
B.8 Proof of Theorem 4.7
For convenience, we introduce a new notation P ro(w) for each w ∈ W . A proposal list P ro(w) of a woman is a list of all men who have proposed to her in the Gale-Shapley algorithm, and the orderings of its entries are the same as her stated preference list. A reduced proposal list contains the top two entries (first entry if only one entry exists) of P ro(w), denoted by P ro r (w). Clearly, each woman w is matched to the first man of P ro r (w).
Lemma B.4. Given all agents' true preference profile (P (M ), P (W )), if a matching µ is in S A with corresponding preference profile P = (P (M ), P (N ), P (L)), then the induced matching is still µ, if for each w ∈ L, we modify w's preference list by moving P ro r (w) to the top and ordering other men arbitrarily.
Proof. Suppose the corresponding matching to the modified preference profile is µ ′ . We show that µ ′ = µ. Let P and P ′ be the original profile and the modified profile. All the partial orders we used in this proof is defined in P . We construct a graph T , which is a sub-graph of suitor graph G(P (M ), P (N ), µ), according to the set of all reduced proposal lists in P . The set of vertices is just M ∪ W , and the edges are E = {(w, µ(w)) | w ∈ W } ∪ {(m, w) | w ≻ m µ(m), m ∈ P ro r (w)}. We also add a virtual vertex s, and add edges from s to each woman who has no incoming edges. Note that every woman has an outgoing edge pointing to her mate in µ, and at most one incoming edge from her second entry in her proposal list. It is easy to prove that at least one woman has only one entry in her proposal list, and thus this woman has no incoming edge except the one from s.
It is straightforward to check that µ is also stable under P ′ . Then we have µ ′ (m) m µ(m), which indicates that if m proposes to some woman w in P ′ , then he also proposes to her in P . Now we can prove the lemma by induction on the height of the breath-first search tree on graph T rooted at s. Denote the height of a vertex as h(v). For each vertex with h(v) = 1, it must be a woman and has no incoming edge from vertices of M . Therefore, she gets only one proposal from µ(w) in P . Therefore each man m other than µ(w) must be matched to a better woman, i.e., µ(m) ≻ m w. Also, as proved above µ ′ (m) m µ(m). Then we have µ ′ (m) ≻ w, which means m does not propose to w in P ′ . The only possible partner for w is µ(w). Thus, we can conclude that she is matched with µ(w) in µ ′ , or µ ′ (w) = µ(w).
Assume µ ′ (v) = µ(v) for each v with h(v) = k, then for a vertex v ′ with h(v ′ ) = k + 1, we prove that we still have µ ′ (v ′ ) = µ(v ′ ). If k + 1 is even, then v ′ is a man and we consider v ′ 's parent v = P rt(v ′ ). From the construction of the graph, there is an edge from v to µ(v). Henceforth, according to the inductive hypothesis, Proof of Theorem 4.7. We first construct the suitor graph using µ and compute the corresponding P (L) according to Theorem 4.3. After that, we can compute P ro(w) and P ro r (w) for each woman w according to P (L). Then we just move the second entry (if exists) of P ro r (w) to the position right after µ(w) in each manipulator w's original preference list. Notice that in the modified preference list, no man who is ranked higher than µ(w) in w's preference list proposes to w, or otherwise the induced matching is unstable with respect to true preference lists. Thus, the orderings of these men is irrelevant to the matching result and we can move P ro r (w) to the top without affecting the induced matching µ ′ for the modified lists. According to Lemma B.4, we can conclude that µ ′ = µ.
B.9 Proof of Theorem 4.8
We prove the following theorem first.
Theorem B.2. In permutation manipulations, it is NP-complete to find a manipulation such that the induced matching is stable with respect to the true preference lists and strictly better off for all manipulators.
Clearly, this problem is in NP since given a preference profile, we can apply Gale-Shapley algorithm to generate the induced matching and verify the solution. In order to show the NP-completeness, we reduce 3-SAT to this problem. Given an instance of 3-SAT φ, suppose the variable set is V = {x 1 , . . . , x n }, the corresponding literal set is L = {+x i , −x i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, and the clause set is {c 1 , . . . , c m }, where
We construct an instance of our problem G(φ) with N = 6n + 2m and M = {m
The set of manipulators is
The preference lists of each agent is specified as follows (the "· · · " part at the end can be anything). For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and each x i , in the positive side (with superscript +),
In the negative side (with superscript −), similarly,
Finally, we specify the preference lists for the agent with subscript c j . For all 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
. where s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ∈ {−, +}. The preference list of w l c j is 6
To complete the reduction, we prove that φ is satisfiable if and only if G(φ) has a solution, i.e., there exists a strategy profile, whose induced matching is stable and strictly better off for all manipulators.
First, notice the stable matching µ generated by true preference lists is µ(m + k
Before providing proofs for both directions, we prove following lemmas first to establish intuitions. 6 If Proof. Denote x i and m − 3 x i , all men in M i only propose to women in W i before they propose to the woman ranking him as the highest. Therefore, with similar arguments, we conclude that m s 1 x i and m s 1 x i with s ∈ {+, −}, he can only make proposals to woman w s ′ k x i with s ′ ∈ {+, −} and k ∈ {1, 2, 3} Third, since w l c j ranks m r c j as favorite and w r c j ranks m l c j as favorite, according to the preference lists of m l c j and m r c j , we can conclude they can only make proposals to w l c j and w r c j ;
Proof of Lemma B.7. To achieve other combinations, w + 2 x i and w − 2 x i can manipulate their preference lists by following the manipulations in Lemma B.5 and Lemma B.6 according to their target partners.
We prove the remaining case by contradiction. Suppose w + 2 x i and w − 2 x i can manipulate to a matching µ such that they are matched with m − 3 x i and m + 3 x i . Then, since w + 2 x i is matched with m − 3 x i , the closed set of rotations ({m
must be eliminated, which contains rotation ({m
Similarly, since w − 2 x i is matched with m + 3 x i , the closed set of rotations ({m
must be eliminated, which contains rotation
Therefore, all of Moreover, from Lemma B.9, since for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m with c j = (
for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Thus, the assignment we create must be a satisfiable assignment for φ.
Lemma B.12. In our construction, if all manipulators are better off in a matching, the matching must be stable.
Proof. First, we point out that if a manipulation induces an unstable matching, then some woman must reject the best proposal she could have in the entire process. Henceforth, she must be a manipulator, while L = {w + 2 x i | ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {w − 2 x i | ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {w r c j | ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m} in our construction. Notice that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m, w r c j can only be matched with m l c j if she is better off, and thus she cannot reject her best received proposal.
The remaining manipulators are w + 2 x i and w − 2 x i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Consider w + 2 x i and the argument for w − 2
x i is similar due to symmetry of construction. Since w + 2 x i is better off, w + 2 x i must be matched with either m − 3 x i or m + 1 x i . In the case that she rejects her best received proposal, w + 2 x i must be matched with m + 1 x i and reject m − 3 x i . However, if w + 2 x i is matched with m + 1 x i , m + 1 x i stops proposing after meeting w + 2 x i , and thus, w − 3
x i cannot reject m − 3 x i since w − 3 x i is a non-manipulator and she does not receive her favorite man m + 1 x i to reject her second favorite man m − 3 x i . Therefore, m − 3 x i has no chance to propose to w + 2 x i and get rejected.
Combining Theorem B.2 and Lemma B.12, we can conclude our theorem.
B.10 Proof of Theorem 4.9
Proof. Since computing the number of satisfiable assignment for 3-SAT problem is #P-complete, we only need to show that our reduction is parsimonious, i.e., the numbers of solutions in each problem are the same. First, we show that given one satisfiable assignment for 3-SAT problem, we can construct a solution in PARETO-BETTER. According to Lemma B.10, we can construct a solution that makes all manipulators better off. Thus, it is sufficient to show that the constructed solution is also Pareto-optimal. In fact, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, either w + 2 x i or w + 2 x i is matched with her favorite partner, but it is impossible for them to be matched with their favorite partners simultaneously. Moreover, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m, w r c j is matched with her favorite partner. Thus, such a solution must be Pareto-optimal.
Second, we show that given a solution to PARETO-BETTER, we can construct a satisfiable assignment for 3-SAT problem. From Lemma B.11, we have shown that given a matching that makes all manipulators better off, we can construct a satisfiable assignment. Thus, given a solution to PARETO-BETTER, we are also able to construct a satisfiable assignment for 3-SAT problem.
C Number of Pareto-optimal matchings
Lemma C.1. There are exactly 2 n different induced matchings, which is Pareto-optimal and weakly better off for all manipulators, in G(φ).
Proof. Notice that, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m, the partner of w r c j is determined by whether there is a man other than m l c j who makes a proposal to w l c j , which is determined by the matching between w s 2 x i and w −s 3 x i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and s ∈ {+, −}. Therefore, we can count the total number according to the number of different matching for w s 2 x i . From Lemma B.7, under Pareto-optimal constraints, there are 2 different choices for each pair of w + 2 x i and w − 2 x i , and they are independent. Thus, the total number of solutions is exactly 2 n .
D Examples
D.1 Example of non-cooperativeness
Consider the following example with 4 men and 4 women. In both cases, w 1 and w 2 can manipulate to get their W-optimal partner. However, if they try to cooperate, it is surprising that they both get worse off than the matching corresponding to their true preference lists. In fact, the only effective way (in which a different matching is induced) for them to manipulate together is that each manipulator performs the operation mentioned above and the induced matching is (m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 3 ), (m 3 , w 2 ), (m 4 , w 4 ).
D.2 Example of general manipulation to an unstable matching
Consider one manipulator w to keep her W-pessimal partner m and reject any better proposals. Therefore, it is equivalent to a manipulation game by removing w from W , m from M and it is possible that in the remaining manipulation game, the W-optimal matching is weakly better off than the W-optimal matching in the original game, though it is unstable with respect to true preference lists. Thus, with the help of manipulator w, a coalition can have a further manipulation to make everyone weakly better off and at least one strictly better off (see Table 4 ).
The only stable matching under true preference lists is {(m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 2 ), (m 3 , w 3 )}. However, consider following manipulation (see Table 5 ).
After the manipulation, the only stable matching is {(m 1 , w 2 ), (m 2 , w 1 ), (m 3 , w 3 )}, in which w 1 and w 2 are strictly better off while w 3 remains the same. However, this matching is unstable with respect to true preference lists. 
D.3 Example of permutation manipulation to an unstable matching
The following example demonstrates that the output of Algorithm 1 is no longer a super-strong Nash equilibrium, without the feasibility assumption (see Table 6 ). Thus, the feasibility assumption is essential for our results to hold. The stable matching is {(m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 2 ), (m 3 , w 3 ), (m 4 , w 4 )}, while only w 3 receives more than one proposals in the entire process. Therefore, suppose the manipulators are w 1 and w 3 , in order to manipulate, the only way is that w 3 keeps m 4 and rejects m 3 , and m 3 proposes to w 1 .
Notice that, if w 1 keeps her favorite man, m 3 , and rejects m 1 , then in the next round, m 1 would propose to w 3 and no matter which one w 3 rejects, either m 1 or m 4 would propose to w 4 and end the process, leaving w 3 worse off. Therefore, the stable matching is Pareto-optimal under feasibility assumption. In order to go beyond Pareto-optimal matching under feasibility assumption, we resort to unstable matching, i.e., w 1 rejects m 3 and still keeps m 1 . (see the entire process in Table 7) 
